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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 11-1378 & 11-4647 
___________ 
 
JACKSON HEWITT, INC. 
 
v. 
 
BARNES ENTERPRISES, INC., a South Carolina Corporation;  
RICHARD S. BARNES, an individual; DJSG UTAH TAX SERVICE, LLC;  
DONALD J. GODBEHERE; SHEILA GODBEHERE; G.A.L.T. INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
a Texas limited liability company; GEORGE SCHULTZ, individual; LINDA SCHULTZ, 
individual; ANDREW FOURNIER, individual; TRACI ELTER, individual;  
H.E.A.T. ENTERPRISES, LLC; ARAKEL HAGOPIAN, a Texas limited liability 
company; NATIONAL TAX NETWORK, LLC; KATHRYNE L. WARD;  
RONALD N. CLARK, an individual; PATSY T. CHANEY, an individual;  
US SERVICES, INC.; ROGER M. YOUNG, JJS FINANCIAL, LLC; JAMES E. HACK; 
SONJA WILLIAMS; JAMES WILLIAMS 
 
DJSG Utah Tax Service, LLC; Donald J. Godbehere; Sheila Godbehere,  
Appellants in No. 11-1378 
 
Donald J. Godbehere; Sheila Godbehere,  
Appellants in No. 11-4647 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 2:10-cv-05108 & 2:10-cv-05330) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 20, 2013 
 
Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  August 22, 2013) 
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___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Before us are two consolidated appeals that stem from a civil action brought by 
Appellee Jackson Hewitt Inc. (“Jackson Hewitt”) against Appellants Donald Godbehere, 
Sheila Godbehere, and DJSG Utah Tax Service, LLC (“DJSG”).  The first appeal 
concerns, inter alia, the District Court’s order granting Jackson Hewitt’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  The second appeal challenges the District Court’s order granting 
Jackson Hewitt’s motion for sanctions in the form of a default judgment.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will dismiss the first appeal for failure to prosecute and affirm the order 
challenged in the second appeal.       
I. 
 DJSG is a former Jackson Hewitt franchisee, and the Godbeheres were the co-
guarantors of DJSG’s franchise agreements with Jackson Hewitt.  In October 2010, 
Jackson Hewitt filed a complaint against Appellants in the District Court, alleging, inter 
alia, trademark infringement, unfair competition, and breach of contract.  The complaint, 
which was docketed at Case No. 2:10-cv-05330, primarily sought damages and injunctive 
relief, including the enforcement of a two-year non-compete provision that was included 
in the franchise agreements.   
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 Around that same time, Jackson Hewitt filed similar complaints in the District 
Court against other former franchisees and guarantors.  In November 2010, the District 
Court consolidated all of these actions under Case No. 2:10-cv-05108.  Several additional 
actions brought by Jackson Hewitt were later added to these consolidated proceedings. 
 In December 2010, Jackson Hewitt moved for a preliminary injunction against 
Appellants.  Appellants opposed that motion; they also cross-moved to dismiss the case 
for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, transfer the case to the United States District 
Court for the District of Arizona.  On January 11, 2011, the District Court entered an 
order denying Appellants’ motion and granting Jackson Hewitt’s motion.  Appellants 
then filed additional motions, requesting, inter alia, reconsideration of the District Court’s 
decision.  While those new motions were pending, Appellants filed a counseled notice of 
appeal challenging the District Court’s January 11, 2011 decision.  That appeal was 
assigned C.A. No. 11-1378.  On February 17, 2011, the District Court issued an opinion 
denying Appellants’ pending motions.  Thereafter, the Godbeheres — but not DJSG — 
filed a counseled notice of appeal challenging that latest decision.  This new notice of 
appeal was docketed as an amended notice of appeal in C.A. No. 11-1378.    
 The District Court proceedings moved forward notwithstanding the notices of 
appeal.  On September 6, 2011, the United States Magistrate Judge who was assigned to 
the case issued a scheduling order that, inter alia, directed Appellants to serve their initial 
disclosures and respond to Jackson Hewitt’s discovery requests by September 22, 2011.  
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The order stressed that failure to comply with this directive would result in sanctions 
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(f) and 37. 
 On September 23, 2011, Jackson Hewitt moved for sanctions against the 
Godbeheres pursuant to Rule 37, arguing that a default judgment was warranted because 
the Godbeheres had failed to comply with the scheduling order.  The Godbeheres did not 
respond to the motion.  On November 29, 2011, the District Court granted the motion, 
concluding that a balancing of the six factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), weighed in favor of imposing sanctions in the 
form of a default judgment.1
 The Godbeheres’ third notice of appeal was docketed as a separate appeal, 
assigned C.A. No. 11-4647, and consolidated with C.A. No. 11-1378.  Appellants’ 
  The Godbeheres then filed a third notice of appeal — this 
time on a pro se basis — challenging this new decision.  In May 2012, the District Court 
deconsolidated the cases and placed this action under its original case number.   
                                              
1 The six Poulis factors are as follows: 
 
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the 
prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet 
scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of 
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the 
attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of 
sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of 
alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim 
or defense. 
 
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (emphasis omitted). 
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attorney in C.A. No. 11-1378 subsequently withdrew as counsel for the Godbeheres, but 
remained as the attorney of record for DJSG.  The appeals are now ready for disposition.2
II. 
 
 We begin our analysis by determining the scope of our review.  DJSG, which is an 
appellant only in C.A. No. 11-1378, has not filed a brief,3
                                              
2 In February 2012, pro se litigant Kathryne Ward, one of the other defendants in the 
consolidated District Court proceedings, advised this Court that she intended to 
participate in the appeal in C.A. No. 11-4647.  A few months later, Ward filed a petition 
for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Arizona.  As a result of that bankruptcy filing, the appeals brought by 
Ward herself, see C.A. Nos. 11-1377 & 11-4646, were stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C.  
§ 362(a).  That stay does not apply, however, to the instant appeals because they do not 
concern an action that was brought against her or otherwise fall under § 362(a).  Because 
Ward has not filed a brief with respect to the instant appeals or indicated her intent to rely 
on one of the other party’s briefing, any arguments that she may have intended to present 
here have been waived.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster 
Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 and the Godbeheres have not 
submitted briefing that addresses that appeal.  Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal in 
C.A. No. 11-1378 for failure to prosecute.  See 3d Cir. LAR Misc. 107.2(b).  To the 
extent that the Godbeheres, in pursuing relief in C.A. No. 11-4647, seek to raise claims 
on behalf of Stephanie Marshall — a former franchisee employee to whom the District 
Court extended the preliminary and permanent injunctions — they may not do so 
because, among other reasons, they are proceeding pro se.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 
(providing that a party may proceed in federal court “personally or by counsel”); cf. Osei-
3 In May 2012, DJSG’s attorney informed this Court that DJSG had filed for bankruptcy 
in February 2011, and that the bankruptcy action was closed in July 2011.  The 
Godbeheres aver that, as a result of those proceedings, DJSG was liquidated.  This may 
explain why DJSG did not file a brief here. 
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Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the appellant, 
a non-lawyer proceeding pro se, could not represent his children in federal court).  All 
that is properly before us, therefore, is the Godbeheres’ challenge in C.A. No. 11-4647 to 
the District Court’s November 29, 2011 order granting a default judgment in favor of 
Jackson Hewitt.  We consider that challenge below. 
 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s November 29, 2011 order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review that decision for abuse of discretion, see 
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1992), and our review 
is “guided by the manner in which the trial court balanced the [Poulis] factors . . . and 
whether the record supports its findings,” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.  “[T]here is no ‘magic 
formula’ or ‘mechanical calculation’ with regard to Poulis analysis,” In re Asbestos 
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 718 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 
538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008)), and “it is not necessary that all of the factors point 
toward a default before that sanction will be upheld,” Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 919. 
 Having reviewed the record, and for substantially the reasons provided by the 
District Court in its opinion accompanying its November 29, 2011 order, we hold that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a balancing of the Poulis 
factors weighed in favor of entering a default judgment.  We note that, in challenging the 
District Court’s November 29, 2011 order, the Godbeheres do not argue that the District 
Court erred in balancing the Poulis factors.  In fact, neither the Godbeheres nor Jackson 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
7 
 
Hewitt even mentions Poulis.  Instead, the parties focus on the start date of the two-year 
non-compete provision.4  But that issue has no bearing on whether the District Court 
abused its discretion in granting a default judgment, particularly given that the entry of 
default did not turn on Poulis’s “merits” factor.5
 In light of the above, we will dismiss the appeal in C.A. No. 11-1378 for failure to 
prosecute, and we will affirm the District Court’s November 29, 2011 judgment.            
 
                                              
4 The provision itself stated that it was to run from the date of the termination of the 
franchise agreements; however, the prayer for relief in Jackson Hewitt’s complaint 
requested that it run from the date of the District Court’s order enforcing that provision.  
The default judgment mirrored that prayer for relief, and the Godbeheres argue that this 
effectively turned the two-year period into a three-and-a-half-year period.  This argument 
is not properly before us.  The District Court did not award that relief on its merits, but 
rather because the Godbeheres had failed to comply with the scheduling order. 
5 The District Court concluded that this factor did not weigh in either side’s favor. 
